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Abstract
Mark-up cyclical behaviour is relevant in determining the size of
government spending multiplier on output. While theoretical liter-
ature priviliged the counteryclical hypothesis, empirical evidence is
far from being conclusive. Based on seminal Rotemberg and Sa-
loner (1986) contribution, we build a theoretical framework based
on Bertrand duopoly, stochastic demand and product di¤erentiation,
where the analysis of cartel stability under partial collusion points
towards procyclical pricing. According to the intensity of marginal
cost cyclicality, this can produce a procyclical mark up or - at least
- render it less countercyclical than expected, with relevant e¤ects on
the transmission mechanism of government spending stimuli.
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1 Introduction
Recent theoretical contributions (Hall, 2009; Woodford, 2011) highlight the
importance of price mark-ups cyclical behaviour for the transmission mech-
anism of scal policy. Previous literature (Galì et al., 2005; Galì, 2005)
had already stressed that an exogenous reduction in the aggregate ine¢ -
ciency wedge (price or wage mark-up) amplies the e¤ects of a government
spending stimulus on aggregate demand, and vice versa. However, by re-
lating mark-up movements to the business cycle, it is possible to investigate
analytically the relationship between government spending multipliers and
the degree of pro/countercyclicality of mark-up. In a stylized sticky prices
macroeconomic model, Hall shows that if we dene (y) = y ! as the price
mark-up, and parameter ! indicates the sensitivity to the income level y,
then:
sign
24@

dy
dg

@!
35 = sign (!)
Considering that the government spending multiplier is positive, equation
(1) means that if the mark-up is countercyclical (! > 0) then the higher the
sensitivity to aggregate demand (! "), the higher the government spending
multiplier

dy
dg
"

. On the other hand, if mark-up is procyclical (! < 0),
a more pronounced cycle elasticity (! ")lowers the expansionary e¤ects of
government purchases on output

dy
dg
#

:
What does economic literature have to say about the direction of mark-up
cyclicality?
Theoretical literature has mainly focused on countercyclicality,1 by taking
two alternative roads that we could label "the macroeconomic view" and "the
industrial organization view".
As to the former, the traditional explanation has centered on nominal
rigidities: if prices are sticky, an increase in aggregate demand - assuming
1Lindbeck and Snower (1987) and Bils (1987) achieve mark-up countercyclicality by es-
tablishing a positive relationship between aggregate demand and elasticity of demand. Ed-
mond and Veldkamp (2009) assign the central role to income distribution: during booms,
income shifts towards the lower tail of the distribution, featured by higher-elasticity con-
sumers.
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exibility of some elements of marginal costs - results in a mark-up reduction
(Rotemberg and Woodford 1999, Woodford 2003).
The industrial organization view focuses instead on rmsstrategic in-
teraction in a non-competitive environment. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)
argue that oligopolies are likely to behave more competitively when demand
rises, especially when price is the strategic variable. Under these circum-
stances, in fact, the benet from deviation is larger, and the punishment is
diminished because it will be implemented when the expansionary demand
shock will have already been absorbed. As a results, price/marginal cost ratio
declines as aggregate demand increases. Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991)
extend the analysis to allow for time-varying rmsexpectations on future de-
mand, by relaxing the assumption of i.i.d. demand shocks so to induce serial
correlation in the cycle. They highlight potential asymmetries in collusive
pricing behavior across di¤erent state of the business cycle, as their ndings
show that collusion is more di¢ cult during recessions than during booms.
In fact, establishing a relation between future and current demand induces
asymmetries between the opportunity costs of engaing in price wars accord-
ing to the direction of demand. Under falling demand, the forgone collusive
prots are on a intertemporally decreasing path, so the incentive to collude
is lower and likely to remain so. On the other hand, in a period of increasing
demand, the traditional Rotemberg and Saloner result is mitigated by the
fact that joint-maximizing prots are going to be higher in the future. Along
this path, Bagwell and Staiger (1997) develop a theory of collusive pricing in
a framework where aggregate demand alternates stochastically between slow
and fast growth states, and where the transition is governed by a Markov
process. They nd that the cyclical behaviour of collusive prices depends cru-
cially on correlation of demand growth rates through time and the expected
duration of boom and recessions. Particularly, collusive prices are procyclical
in presence of positive demand correlation through time, and countercyclical
otherwise. Furthermore, the amplitude of the collusive pricing is larger when
the recession has a longer expected duration or - conversely- when the boom
has a lower lenght. Those two contributions stress that the qualitative and
quantitative dimensions of collusive pricing can di¤er according to the state
of the business cycle. Such an asymmetry in the intensity of the collusion is
directly related to the mark-up cyclical behaviour and thus - as we will argue
- to the size of government spending multipliers. Therefore, those results
might provide an explanation for multipliersasymmetries over the business
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cycle (Canzoneri et al., 2011)2.
More recently, a new strand of literature combines traditional general
equilibrium macro models with an industrial organization approach, empha-
sizing the procyclicality of entry in determining mark-up countercyclicality,
through the competition e¤ect (Ghironi and Melitz 2005, Jaimovich and
Floetotto 2008, Etro and Colciago 2010)
However, how empirically robust is the evidence about mark-up counter-
cyclicality?
Although a considerable number of contributions points towards coun-
tercyclicality,3 empirical literature on mark-up cyclical behaviour is not un-
ambiguous. Donowitz et al. (1986,1988) nd evidence on procyclicality in
the US; Chirinko and Fazzari (1994) use a dynamic factor model to esti-
mate markups, nding that they are procyclical in nine of the eleven 4-digit
industries they analyze. Updating Bils (1987) analysis - in favor of counter-
cyclicality - with more recent and richer data, Nekarda and Ramey (2010)
nd that all measures of markups are either procylical or acyclical.
Hall (2009) provides a simple rst-cut test for cyclicality by noting that
the mark-up can be expressed as the ratio between the elasticity of output
with respect to labor input
 
@Y
@L
L
Y

and the share of labor compensation over
nominal income
 
WL
PY
= s

. In fact, since by the envelope theorem property, a
cost-minimizing rm equalizes the marginal cost of increasing output across
all possible margins for varying production, we can express marginal cost as:
MC =
W
@Y
@L
(1)
As gross mark-up (= ) is dened as the ratio between price index and
marginal costs,and multiplying and dividing by Y
L
; then:
 =
@Y
@L
L
Y
s
(2)
2Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) develop the idea of mark-up countercyclicality in
a dynamic general equilibrium setting, nding that the models empirical performances
are closer to actual postwar US data than the corresponding predictions of the perfectly
competitive model.
3See Martins (1996) on OECD, Chevalier et al. (2003) on the US, Portier (1995) on
France.
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If the production process is approximated by a Cobb-Douglas Y = LK1 ;
then the numerator of (2) is  and can be considered relatively stable over
time. Thus, the countercyclicality of the mark-up  requires the procyclical-
ity of labor share s:
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of labor share and output in ve major
OECD economies from 1990 to 2009.
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We can notice that labour share is far from showing an unambigous pro-
cyclical behaviour ; table 1 reports a simple correlation analysis showing that
- with the exception of US - there seems to be a negative rather than positive
correlation between labor share and the business cycle.
Table 1: Correlation between detrendend GDP and labour share
COUNTRY CORRELATION
US 0.61
UK 0
FRANCE -0.12
GERMANY -0.52
ITALY -0.49
In this paper, we present a theoretical framework based on strategic in-
teraction able to rationalize the existence of pro-cyclical pricing. Our bench-
mark model is the one put forward by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). We
indeed set out by o¤ering a brief summary of their analysis, reconstructing
the countercyclical behavour of prices in a simple repeated duopoly game with
homogeneous goods, in which demand is subject to random shocks a¤ecting
the reservation price. In addition to their result, we show that increasing the
probability of a positive shock brings about an increase in cartel stability,
which could be large enough to more than counterbalance the e¤ect identi-
ed by Rotemberg and Saloner. Then, we review the established IO debate
on the behaviour of rms involved in an implicitly collusive price supergame
under product di¤erentiation and perfect certainty, producing well dened
procyclical conclusions. Our e¤ective contribution consists in bridging the
two approaches, pursuing two distinct but related goals: (i) to characterise
the maximum degree of collusion (i.e., the highest collusive price) that can
be sustained in a stochastic environment, given time preferences and product
di¤erentiation; and (ii) to check whether the counterciclity emerging under
stochastic demand and perfect product substitutability can indeed be com-
patible with the seemingly opposite result produced by the traditional cartel
theory belonging to IO, in which much emphasis is posed on product di¤er-
entiation but this is accompanied by perfect certainty. Our analysis indeed
shows that, provided unilateral deviations grant monopoly power, Rotemberg
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and Saloners countercyclical pricing can be seen as the limit of a general
model in which, for su¢ ciently high (low) degrees of product di¤erentiation,
procyclical (countercyclical) pricing obtains.
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 recalls the Rotember
and Saloners framework, generalized in stochastic demand framework. Sec-
tion 3 inserts product di¤erentiation and proves that this feature reverts the
traditional countercyclical pricing of the benchmank model. In section 4
we provide a framework able to bridge the two positions. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 Preliminaries: the status-quo.
We set out by briey summarising rst Rotemberg and Saloners (1986)
model of countercyclical pricing, and then the features of implicitly collusive
pricing in supergame-theoretic models deeply investigated in the industrial
organization literature.
2.1 Countercyclical pricing
The following is a simplied version of their setup, in which we will focus on
the behaviour of a cartel formed by two (instead of n) rms, without further
loss of generality.4 As in their paper, we consider a market for a homogenous
good, over an innite horizon. Time t is discrete, with t = 0; 1; 2; :::1; and
the demand function at any time t is pt = t q1t q2t; with qit  0 being rm
is output. Firms have identical technologies represented by the cost function
Ci = cqi; with t > c  0: To ease the exposition throughout the paper, and
again w.l.o.g., we set c = 0. The prot function of the individual rm thus
coincides with revenues, i = pqi. The reservation price t is stochastic, and
in each period can take one of two values, a > b; with probabilities p (a) = m
and p (b) = 1 m; respectively, with m 2 [0; 1] :
The supergame unravels following the rules of Friedmans (1971) per-
fect folk theorem, whereby any unilateral deviation from the collusive path
4This exposition relies on (and slightly generalises) the simplied version of the coun-
tercyclical pricing model in Tirole (1988, pp. 248-250).
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is punished by a permanent reversal to the Nash equilibrium of the con-
stituent stage game forever (the so-called grim trigger strategy). In the
present setting, product homogeneity entails that the per-period prots at
the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium are nil. As in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986),
suppose rms (i) set prices after having observed the state of demand (either
a or b), and (ii) collude at the monopoly price in each period. Later, we will
come to the case of partial collusion.
At any t; monopoly price pMt = t=2 delivers the individual expected
cartel prot:
EC =
mM (a) + (1 m)M (b)
2
=
ma2 + (1 m) b2
8
: (3)
If a rm contemplates the possibility of deviation, the best option is to do
so in a period of high demand, so that slightly undercutting the monopoly
price grants the cheating rms full monopoly prots in that period, D =
a2=4: As already explained above, such deviation at any t is punished by
driving prots to zero from t + 1 to doomsday through the adoption of the
marginal cost pricing rule at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Assuming rms
share identical time preferences measured by a symmetric and time-invariant
discount factor  2 (0; 1) ; the stability of price collusion requires  to meet
the following necessary and su¢ cient condition:
EC
1X
t=0
t  D , a
2 [1   (1 +m)] + b2 (1 m) 
8 (1  ) (4)
which is satised by all
  a
2
a2 (1 +m) + b2 (1 m)  
; (5)
with
@
@a
=
2ab2 (1 m)
[a2 (1 +m) + b2 (1 m)]2 > 08m 2 [0; 1) : (6)
Property (6) indicates that the critical threshold of the discount factor stabil-
ising full collusion increases with the good state. This is one of the elements
leading to the (by now classical) interpretation of this model, according to
which rms should collude less if demand gets higher, as the size of the mar-
ket ensures high prots anyway, and this this suggests the idea of counter-
ciclical pricing. This argument is reinforced if one examines the perspective
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of activating some degree of partial collution at the highest pP 2  0; pM
sustainable for  < :
All of the above is based on comparative statics taken w.r.t. a. Another
possibility (not examined in Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) is to assess the
e¤ect of a change in m on cartel stability:
@
@m
=   a
2 (a  b) (a+ b)
[a2 (1 +m) + b2 (1 m)]2 < 08m 2 [0; 1) (7)
revealing that an increase in the probability attached to the good state makes
full collusion easier to sustain. This, on the contrary, has a denite procycli-
cal avour. Moreover, using (6-7), we can construct the marginal rate of
substitution between a and m as follows:
da
dm
=  @

@m
 @a
@
=
a (a  b) (a+ b)
2b2 (1 m) > 0; (8)
illustrating the complementarity between a and m. Correspondingly, 
yields the map appearing in Figure 1, with 1 > 

2 > 

3: The curves are
upward sloping and convex in m; for all m 2 [0; 1] and a > b: Hence, given
any admissible value ofm; an increase in a makes it more di¢ cult for rms to
sustain collusion along the frontier of monopoly prots. Conversely, however,
given any a > b, an increase in m generates the opposite e¤ect. Overall, the
balance between the two may indeed leave the critical threshold unmodied.
This suggests that, if probabilities can be generated of at least a¤ected by a
policy makers announcements, a governement might indeed exploit its own
credibility to inuence rmspricing behaviour in the desired direction.
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Figure 1: The critical discount factor for full collusion in the space (m; a).
6
-
1
(b; 0)
a
m
2
3
1
We may summarise the above exposition into the following:
Lemma 1 Under demand uncertainty and product homogeneity, any positive
shock on demand increasing the level of the reservation price in the best state
makes price collusion more di¢ cult to sustain, all else equal.
2.2 Implicit price collusion in oligopoly supergames
The standard approach in industrial organization theory rules out uncer-
tainty to focus instead on the bearings of product di¤erentiation on the in-
tensity and stability of implicit collusion.5 Accordingly, we consider a market
where two single-product rms o¤er di¤erentiated products over discrete time
5The material appearing in this section is a compact exposition of a large debate. See
Deneckere (1983), Majerus (1988), Chang (1991, 1992), Rothschild (1992), Ross (1992),
Lambertini (1997) and Albæk and Lambertini (1998), inter alia.
11
t = 0; 1; 2; 3; :::1. At any t; the inverse demand function for variety i is (see
Spence, 1976; and Singh and Vives, 1984, inter alia):
pi = a  qi   sqj (9)
where s 2 [0; 1] is the symmetric degree of substitutability between any pair
of varieties. If s = 1; products are completely homogeneous; if instead s = 0;
strategic interaction disappears and rms are independent monopolists over
n separated markets. The direct demand function to be used under Bertrand
behaviour obtains by inverting the system (9):
qi =
a
1 + s
  pi
1  s2 +
spj
1  s2 : (10)
As in the previous model, rms share the same technology, summarised by
the cost function Ci = cqi; wit marginal cost c being normalised to zero for
the sake of simplicity. Therefore, per-period individual prots are i = piqi:
Throughout the game, rms also share the same intertemporal preferences
measured by the constant discount factor  2 (0; 1) :
The perfect folk theorem yields the following condition, that must be
satised in order for the collusive path to be stable:
C
1X
t=0
t  D + N
1X
t=1
t; (11)
where, unlike the previous model, N  0 is the prot generated by the
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the constituent game; it is positive whenever
some degree of product di¤erentiation exists. Likewise, product di¤erentia-
tion entails that D 2  C ; 2C ; i.e., the cheating rm may not necessarily
stand alone in the market in the deviation period.
Four relevant cases are to be examined:
 rms time preferences allow for full collusion at the pure monopoly
price, and product di¤erentiation is high enough to allow the cheated
rm to operate on the market with positive market share and prots
in the deviation period;
 rms time preferences allow for full collusion at the pure monopoly
price, but product di¤erentiation is low enough to cause the cheated
rms market share and prots to fall to zero in the deviation period;
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 rmstime preferences only allow for some degree of partial collusion,
and product di¤erentiation is high enough to allow the cheated rm to
operate on the market with positive market share and prots in the
deviation period;
 rmstime preferences only allow for some degree of partial collusion,
but product di¤erentiation is low enough to cause the cheated rms
market share and prots to fall to zero in the deviation period.
What is common to all of the above four cases is the per-period Bertrand-
Nash prot N appearing on the r.h.s. of (11), that can be quickly worked
out once and for all.
The rst order condition for the maximization of i w.r.t. pi is
@i
@pi
=
a (1  s)  2pi + spj
1  s2 = 0 (12)
whereby the symmetric Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price is
pN =
a (1  s)
2  s (13)
with prots
N =
a2 (1  s)
(1 + s) (2  s)2 ; (14)
both falling to zero in the homogeneous good case.
2.2.1 Full collusion
Under full collusion, both rms set the monopoly price
pM =
a
2
(15)
which yields the symmetric share of monopoly prots
C =
a2
4 (1 + s)
=
M
2
(16)
to each rm.
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Now look at the deviation period, and suppose the cheated rms remains
on the market selling a positive output. The optimal deviation is the best
reply to pM ; i.e.:
pD
 
pM

=
a (2  s)
4
(17)
which is viable as long as the resulting sales volume of the rm remaining
loyal to the cartel is positive, which requires
s 2
h
0;
p
3  1

: (18)
The deviation prots are
D =
a2 (2  s)2
16 (1  s2) : (19)
If instead s 2  p3  1; 1 ; then the cheated rm is out of business and
the deviator stands alone on the market place. In this range, the deviation
price solves
qch =
a
1 + s
  p
M
1  s2 +
spD
1  s2 = 0; (20)
yielding
pD
0  
pM

=
a (2s  1)
2s
(21)
delivering deviation prots equal to
D
0  
pM

=
a2 (2s  1)
4s2
: (22)
Then one can easily verify that
pD
 
pM

= pD
0  
pM

and D
 
pM

= D
0  
pM

(23)
in correspondence of s =
p
3  1:
We can now turn to the derivation of the critical thresholds of the discount
factor , above which full collusion is sustainable in the two cases. For
all s 2 0;p3  1, (19) is the relevant deviation prot, and the critical
threshold of the discount factor above which full collusion in prices is stable
is
B =
D
 
pM
  M
D (pM)  BN =
(2  s)2
8 (1  s) + s2 (24)
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while for all s 2  p3  1; 1 ; i.e., in the region where (22) applies, it is

0
B =
D
0  
pM
  M
D0 (pM)  BN =
(2  s)2 [s (1 + s)  1]
(2  s)2 [s (1 + s)  1] + s4 (25)
with 
0
B = 1=2 if s = 1:
2.2.2 Partial collusion
Here we deal with the performance of a cartel whose memberstime prefer-
ences are below the thresholds identied above. The issue, in such a case, is
to nd the highest collusive price p 2  pN ; pM sustainable over time, given
. If all rms set the collusive output p; the per-period prots of each cartel
member are
C =
(a  p) p
1 + s
: (26)
Again, the optimal deviation against the cartel price will take two dif-
ferent forms, depending on the degree of substitutability s. If the latter is
su¢ ciently low (i.e., product di¤erentiation between the two varieties is high
enough), the deviator will adopt its best reply to cartel pricing solving (12)
in which one has to plug pj = p; to get the optimal deviation price
pD (p) =
a (1  s) + sp
2
: (27)
This generates the following one-o¤ deviation prots
D (p) =
[a (1  s) + sp]2
4 (1  s2) ; (28)
provided that the cheated rm is still active, i.e., it must be selling a positive
quantity qch. This happens if
qch =
1
2

a  p   p

2 (1  s) +
2 (a  p) + p
2 (1 + s)

> 0 (29)
which requires
p 2

pN ;
a (1  s) [2 + s (6  s)]
2  s2

: (30)
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In this price range, condition (11) yields the following highest collusive price
p =
a (1  s) [4  s (1  ) (1  s)]
(2  s) [4 (1  s) + s2 (1  )] (31)
which is monotonically increasing in a and lower than pM for all admissible
values of s and .
Now we turn our attention to the collusive price range wherein any unilat-
eral deviation makes the cheating rm a monopolist, driving all loyal cartel
members out of business. This happens if expression (29) is non positive,
i.e., for all
p 2

a (1  s) [2 + s (6  s)]
2  s2 ;
a+ c
2

(32)
with
a+ c
2
 a (1  s) [2 + s (6  s)]
2  s2
for all s 2
hp
3  1; 1
i
: (33)
Imposing qCh = 0 yields the deviation price
pD
0
(p) =
p   a (1  s)
s
(34)
which in turn delivers the deviation prots
D
0  
pM

=
(a  p) [p   a (1  s)]
4s2
: (35)
It can be easily checked that pD
0
(p) = pD (p) in correspondence of
p =
a (1  s) [2 + s (6  s)]
2  s2 : (36)
Plugging the above expression in the stability condition (11) and solving
w.r.t. p; one obtains
p
0
 =
a
h
4  (5  2s) s2    (2  s)2 (1 + s) sp
i
2 (2  s) [(1  ) (1 + s)  s2] (37)
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in which
 = 2

(4 + s) s  (2  s) s3+ (2s  1) s2   4 (1  s)  (4 + s) s+(2  s)2 :
(38)
One can verify that  > 0; by solving  = 0 w.r.t.  and checking that
the resulting solutions  6= R for all s 2
p
3  1; 1. Therefore,  has the
same sign as the coe¢ cient of 2 in (38), which is positive, as can be easily
ascertained. Moreover, the denominator of p
0
 is positive for all s and  in
the unit interval.
The next step consists in observing that
a (1  s) [2 + s (6  s)]
2  s2 < p
0
  <
a
2
< p
0
+ (39)
for all  < 
0
B : Accordingly, we select p
0
  as the optimal collusive price in the
admissible parameter range identied by
 2  ;  and s 2 hp3  1; 1i : (40)
The partial derivative of p
0
+ w.r.t. a is:
@p
0
 
@a
=
(2  s) [(1  ) (2 + s)  s2 (2  )]  sp
2 (2  s) [(1  ) (1 + s)  s2] (41)
Therefore, relying on the fact that  > 0, we may evaluate the sign of the
numerator of @p
0
 =@a by evaluating the sign of
(2  s)2 (1  ) (2 + s)  s2 (2  )2   s4 (42)
which turns out to be positive for all  2
h
0;e : The latter result, together
with Lemma 3, implies that @p
0
 =@a > 0 in the entire admissible range (40).
Hence, the foregoing discussion allows us to formulate:
Lemma 2 In the Bertrand supergame under perfect certainty, any increase
(resp., decreases) in consumersreservation price increases (resp., decreases)
the intensity of partial collusion, for any degree of product di¤erentiation and
irrespective of whether unilaterial deviation from the collusive path grants the
cheating rm monopoly power or not.
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3 Bridging two visions
What we have reviewed so far boils down to the following two synthetic and
seemingly antithetic messages:
i] if goods are undi¤erentiated and the market is subject to stochastic shoks
a¤ecting consumers reservation price, then rms pricing behaviour
exhibits a denite countercyclical pattern;
ii] if goods are di¤erentiated and the demand level is deterministic, then
optimal cartel prices are always monotonically related to the reservation
price, heedless of rmstime preferences.
Our aim in this section is to develop anew a model in which product
di¤erentiation and uncertainty operate together, so as to see whether the
above conclusions may indeed be compatible with each other. As a rst
step, we will examine the case in which duopolistic competition survives
unilateral deviations from cartel pricing. The second step will be to look at
the opposite case where the defecting rm attains a monopolistic position.
On the supply side, the setup is the same as above. On the demand side,
the demand function for rm i will be:
qit =
t
1 + s
  pit
1  s2 +
spjt
1  s2 ; (43)
with t 2 fa; bg ; a > b > 0 and probabilities p (a) = m and p (b) = 1  m;
respectively, with m 2 [0; 1] :
3.1 Best reply deviation and the persistence of duopoly
Here, the deviation price maximises D and qch > 0: We set out by taking a
quick look at the stability condition for full collusion.
Monopoly price in state t is pMt = t=2; delivering expected per-rm
cartel prots
EC =
ma2 + (1 m) b2
4 (1 + s)
: (44)
The deviation price and prots in correspondence of the best demand state
correspond to (17) and (19), respectively, and apply for all s 2 0;p3  1.
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The individual expected Bertrand-Nash prots in each period of the punish-
ment phase are given by
EN =
[ma2 + (1 m) b2] (1  s)
(1 + s) (2  s)2 : (45)
As a result, collusive stability now requires
  a
2 (2  s)2
a2

4m (1  s)  (2  s)2+ b2 (1 m)2 (1  s)2  ; (46)
with
@
@a
/ (1 m) (1  s) > 08m 2 [0; 1) ; s 2
h
0;
p
3  1

(47)
and
@
@m
/   (1  s) < 08s 2
h
0;
p
3  1

: (48)
As for partial collusion, dene
EC =
m (a  p (a)) p (a) + (1 m) (b  p (b)) p (b)
1 + s
(49)
with p (b) = b=2, in such a way that the only unknown is the partially
collusive price in the best state, p (a). That is, we assume rms will charge
the best collusive price in the worst state, and appropriately tune p (a) so as
to satisfy the stability condition (11), which we are about to construct step
by step.
Accordingly, the best deviation against p (a) along the reaction function
is
pD (p (a)) =
a (1  s) + sp (a)
2
: (50)
Then the expected payo¤ in each period of the punishment phase is (45).
From the usual stability condition, we get the pair of solutions:
p (a) =
a (2  s) (1  s) 2 (1  s) sp	
(2  s) [s2 (1  ) + 4 (1  s)] (2  s)2     4m (1  s)  (2  s)2
(51)
where
 = [2m+ (2  s) (1  )] s2 (1  ) + 4 (1  s) > 0 (52)
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and
	 = a2m2

s2 (1  ) + 4 (1  s)2+ (53)
4b2 (2  s)2 (1  ) (1 m) (2  s)2     4m (1  s)  (2  s)2 > 0:
It is then easily checked that
lim
m!1
p (a)  =
a (1  s) [4  s (1  ) (1  s)]
(2  s) [4 (1  s) + s2 (1  )] = p
 (54)
i.e., the same price as in (31). Finally, taking the partial derivative of p (a) 
w.r.t. a; one can verify that
@p 
@a
/ a2m2 s2 (1  ) + 4 (1  s) (2  s)2 (1  ) + 4m+
4b2 (2  s)4 (1  ) (1 m) [2m+ (2  s) (1  )]2 > 0 (55)
everywhere.
Therefore, we can state
Proposition 3 If deviation from the collusive path does not grant monopoly
power, then the maximum collusive price sustainable under stochastic demand
conditions is monotonically increasing in the level of the best demand state.
3.2 Defecting to monopoly
The last step consists in investigating the case in which a unilateral devia-
tion from the cartel price turns the deviator into a monopolist. Under full
collusion, the only detail that has to be modied is the deviation price in
correspondence of the best state, which causes the cheated rms output
to drop to zero. This is (21), ensuring the deviation prots (22) for all
s 2 p3  1; 1. The resulting stability condition is
  a
2 (2  s)2 [(1 + s) s  1]
a2 [s4 (m+ 1) + 4 (4s  1)  s2 (1 + 3s)] + b2 (1 m) s4  
0 ; (56)
with @
0
=@a > 0 and @
0
=@m < 0 for all s 2 p3  1; 1, so that the picture
remains much the same as we already know it, along the frontier of industry
prots.
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Now suppose rmstime preferences fall short of (56). If so, they may ac-
tivate the highest sustainable degree of partial collusion. In such a case, they
set p (b) = b=2 whenever demand is low, and solve the stability condition
w.r.t. p (a) ; obtaining:
p
0
 (a) =
a (2  s) [(1  ) (2  s (2s  1))  ms2] sp 
2 (2  s) [(1  ) (1 + s (1  s))  ms2] (57)
in which
  = a2

s2 (1   (1 ms))2+ (58)
4 (1  ) ((1  ) (1  s)  m (2s  1))]
 b2s2 (1 m) (1  ) (1 + s (1  s))  ms2
with
(1  ) (2  s (2s  1))  ms2 > 0; (59)
s2 (1   (1 ms))2 + 4 (1  ) ((1  ) (1  s)  m (2s  1)) > 0 (60)
and
 s2 (1 m) (1  ) (1 + s (1  s))  ms2 < 0 (61)
for all  and m in the unit interval and all s 2 p3  1; 1 : In the same
parameter region, one also has that (i)   > for all
a2
b2
>
s2 (1 m) [(1  ) (1 + s (1  s))  ms2]
s2 (1   (1 ms))2 + 4 (1  ) ((1  ) (1  s)  m (2s  1)) (62)
with the threshold on the r.h.s. of (62) being always lower than one (hence,
both p
0
  (a) and p
0
+ (a) are real), and (ii) p
0
  (a) :
To identify the correct solution, it su¢ ces to verify that
lim
m!1
p
0
  (a) =
a
h
4  (5  2s) s2    (2  s)2 (1 + s)  sp
i
2 (2  s) [(1  ) (1 + s)  s2] = p
0
 : (63)
The last step consist in di¤erentiating p
0
  (a) w.r.t. a; dening a = rb
with r > 1 and then solving @p
0
  (a) =@a = 0 w.r.t. r; getting
6
r =
s (2  s) [(1  ) (2  s (2s  1))  ms2]p (1 m) [(1  ) (1 + s (1  s))  ms2]
2
p
(1  s) 
 = r
(64)
6The second solution can be disregarded as it is always negative.
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with

 =

(1  ) (1 + s (1  s))  ms2 ms2   (1  ) (2  s)2 (1 + s)
s2 (1   (1 ms))2 + 4 (1  ) ((1  ) (1  s) + m (2s  1)) : (65)
Now, it can be shown analytically that r 2 R+; moreover,
lim
m!1
r = 0 and (66)
lim
m!0
r =
s [2 (1  s2) + s]p
(2  s)p(1  ) (1  s2) > 1 (67)
for all
 >
(2  s)2 (1  s2)
s2 + 4 [1  s (1 + s (1  s)) (1  s) (1  s2)] =  (68)
which is decreasing and concave in s, with  = 3
 
39 + 38
p
3

=937 ' 0:336
in s =
p
3  1 and  = 0 in s = 1: Consequently, we have that
@p
0
  (a)
@a
> 0 for all r > max f1; rg (69)
and conversely between one and r, if indeed r > 1: In general, r is decreasing
and concave in m (this can ve ascertained numerically), and will give rise
to a picture like the one reported in Figure 2, in which "+" and "-" signs
indicate the sign of @p
0
  (a) =@a:
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Figure 2: Collusive pricing in the space (m; r).
6
-
r
m
1
 
+
(0; 0) 1
To sum up, above the upper envelope @p
0
  (a) =@a > 0; if r > 1 for at least
some acceptable parameter values, then in such a region @p
0
  (a) =@a < 0:
7
An analogous exercise can be carried out in the space (s; a) as well as in
(; a) : This is done in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. In particular, Figure 3
shows that countercyclical pricing emerges in the region in which r 2 (1; r)
and the two product varieties are su¢ ciently close substitutes. It is also
worth observing that r asymptotically increases to innity as s approaches
1 in the limit, in which case pricing is countercyclical irrespective of r; as in
Rotemberg and Saloners (1986) original formulation.
7Recall that in state b, by assumption, rms collude on the monopoly frontier.
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Figure 3: Collusive pricing in the space (s; r).
6
-
r
s
1
+
 
(0; 0) 1
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Figure 4: Collusive pricing in the space (; r).
6
-
r

1
+
 
(0; 0) 1=2
Our nal result can be therefore stated as follows:
Proposition 4 If deviation from the collusive path grants monopoly power,
then the maximum collusive price sustainable under stochastic demand condi-
tions is monotonically decreasing (increasing) in the level of the best demand
state if product di¤erentiation is low (high) enough.
4 Concluding remarks
The e¤ective size of government spending multipliers is a crucial macroeco-
nomic issue, especially after the massive scal stimuli of 2009-2010 and the
need for spending cuts which is becoming more and more pressing. In im-
perfectly competitive frameworks, multiplierssize is increasing function of
mark-up countercyclicality but decreasing function of its procyclicality. As a
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consequence, determining the e¤ective direction of pricing cyclicality becomes
crucial for the analysis of a government spending stimulus on agggregate ac-
tivity.
We have used a repeated duopoly game to revisit the issue of cyclical
pricing so as to reconcile Rotemberg and Saloners (1986) results about the
emergence of countercyclical pricing under uncertainty with the procyclical
avour traditionally associated with implicit collusion in the perfect certainty
approach typical of the large debate on this topic in the theory of industrial
organization.
The bottom line of our analysis is that the cyclical properties of rms
pricing behaviour are sensitive to the degree of product di¤erentiation across
product varieties, in such a way that pricing is procyclical whenever the
cheated rm retains a positive market share during deviations (because prod-
ucts are weak substitutes), while instead counterciclicity indeed obtains pro-
vided that (i) the deviator becomes a monopolist and (ii) product di¤erenti-
ation is su¢ ciently low.
Mark-up cyclical behaviour might therefore be a far more complicated
issue than previously thought, with relevent consequences on the actual ef-
fects of expansionary expenditure-based scal policies. Future research will
be concerned with an empirical analysis attempting to link di¤erent sectors
(featured by di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation) with di¤erent cycli-
cal properties of their average mark-ups.
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